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Direct Tests of Models of Social Preferences and a New Model 
 
 
By James C. Cox and Vjollca Sadiraj 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Departures from “economic man” behavior in many games in which fairness is a 
salient characteristic are now well documented in the experimental economics literature. These 
data have inspired development of new models of social preferences incorporating inequality 
aversion and quasi-maximin preferences. We report experiments that provide direct tests of these 
social preference models. Data from the experiments motivate a new model of egocentric 
altruism. The model rationalizes data from our direct test experiments and data from experiments 
with proposer competition and responder competition. We discuss generalizations of the 
egocentric altruism model that incorporate agents’ intentions and thus provide a unified 
approach to modeling behavior in games both with and without reciprocal motivation. 
 
Keywords: social preferences, fairness, experiments  
 
JEL Classifications: A12, A13, B49, C70, C91, D63 
1. Introduction 
Economics has a long history of using models of preferences. The preferences are conventionally 
represented by utility functions and their indifference maps. Until recently, the preferences most 
commonly used have been self-regarding (or “economic man”) preferences in which an agent 
cares about his own material payoffs but is indifferent about the material payoffs of others. There 
is now a large literature that supports the conclusion that self-regarding preference models are 
mostly inconsistent with behavior in experiments in which distributional fairness is a salient 
characteristic. This has motivated the development of new models of other-regarding (or “social”) 
preferences. 
We report direct tests of the central properties of recent prominent contributions to 
modeling social preferences, including inequality aversion models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 and 
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and a quasi-maximin model (Charness and Rabin, 2002). The 
distinguishing characteristic of inequality aversion models is that utility is decreasing with the 
difference between one’s own and others’ material payoffs. The distinguishing characteristic of 
the quasi-maximin model is that utility is increasing with the lowest of all agents’ payoffs (the 
maximin property) and the total of all agents’ payoffs (the efficiency property). These 
distinguishing characteristics of the two types of models provide the basis for our direct tests of 
the models. 
 Fairness game data come from experiments with different types of games, including: (a) 
reciprocal-motivation games, such as the ultimatum game, in which beliefs about others’ possible 
future actions and imputations of the intentions behind their past actions can affect agents’ 
behavior; and (b) simple distribution games, such as the dictator game, in which such beliefs and 
imputations are irrelevant (within the context of the experiment). The inequality aversion and 
quasi-maximin models that we test are models of preferences that are not conditional on others’ 
revealed intentions nor beliefs about their future actions. Therefore, it is appropriate to conduct 
direct tests of these models with experiments involving simple distribution games rather than 
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reciprocal-motivation games. Our tests are conducted with specially-designed dictator games that 
are constructed to test the central distinguishing characteristics of the models. 
Data from the experiments are mostly inconsistent with the inequality aversion and quasi-
maximin models. Furthermore, the data do not indicate noisy or random behavior by the subjects 
in the experiments. Instead, the data are mostly consistent with a model of other-regarding 
preferences with the conventional regularity properties of positive monotonicity and strict 
convexity (of indifference curves). These data motivate our development of a model of egocentric 
altruism in which preferences are positively monotonic and strictly convex. This model is applied 
to data from our four experiments and data from experiments with proposer competition (Roth, et 
al., 1991) and responder competition (Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere, 1997).  
Our strategy in modeling other-regarding preferences is to implement a unified approach 
that develops a model that is consistent with behavior in simple distribution games and then 
generalizes that model to incorporate intentions. This paper focuses on modeling behavior in 
simple distribution games. We also explain how the model developed here can be extended in a 
straightforward way to incorporate intentions. This modeling strategy provides a unified approach 
to modeling behavior in games both with and without reciprocal motivation. 
  
2. Experiment 1: A Direct Test of Inequality Aversion 
Inequality aversion models are based on the assumption that an agent’s utility is increasing with 
her own material payoff but decreasing with the difference between her own and others’ material 
payoffs. For the special case of two agents and (scalar) money payoffs, the fundamental property 
of inequality aversion models is that the indifference curves have positive slopes in the part of the 
money payoff space in which the other’s payoff is higher than one’s own. This property forms the 
basis of a direct test for inequality aversion. 
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2.1 Experimental Design and Procedures 
Experiment 1 involves a dictator game with the following characteristics. Subjects are randomly 
assigned to pairs. In addition to a show-up fee of $5, each subject in a pair is given an endowment 
of $10. The “non-dictators” have no decision to make.  The dictators are told that they can send 
zero or a positive amount (in whole dollar units), up to $10, from their endowment to the other 
person. Each dollar that a dictator transfers to the other person is multiplied by three by the 
experimenters. The experimental protocol uses double-blind payoff procedures in which neither 
the other subjects nor the experimenters can identify the individual who has chosen any specific 
action. All of the features of the experiment, including the equal endowments of dictators and 
non-dictators, are common information given to the subjects. The experiment procedures are 
described in detail in Appendix 1. The subject instructions are available on request to the authors.  
 
2.2 Predictions of the Inequality-Aversion Models 
Figure 1 shows typical indifference “curves” for the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model for the 
dictator’s (“my”) money payoff m and the other subject’s (“your”) money payoff y. All parameter 
values for this model that are consistent with its defining characteristic of inequality (or 
“inequity”) aversion imply that the indifference “curves” have positive slope above the 45-degree 
line. (See Appendix 2 for derivation of these properties of the indifference “curves.”) Including 
the $5 show-up fees in payoffs, the budget constraint of a dictator in experiment 1 consists of 
ordered pairs of integers on the dashed line in Figure 1 extending from the point (15,15) on the 
45-degree line to the point (5, 45) near the vertical axis. In this dictator game, the Fehr-Schmidt 
model predicts that a dictator will give 0 dollars to the other subject.  
Figure 2 shows typical graphs of the level sets or indifference curves of the Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) “motivation function” for the two-agent case with 0>+ ym . (See Appendix 2 
for derivation of these properties of the indifference curves.) This model predicts that the dictator 
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will give 0 dollars to the other subject for the same reason as does the Fehr-Schmidt model: above 
the 45-degree line, the indifference curves have positive slope whereas the budget line has 
negative slope. 
 
2.3  Subjects’ Behavior in Experiment 1 
Data from experiment 1 are reported in Figure 3 with the light-colored bars. In this experiment 19 
of 30 or 63% of the dictators gave positive amounts to the other person and, hence, exhibited 
behavior that is inconsistent with inequality aversion. The 63% of dictators who sent positive 
amounts of money to the other subjects imposed significant costs on themselves to increase 
inequality favoring others. This behavior is inconsistent with the central distinguishing 
characteristic of inequality aversion models. The average amount given away by the dictators was 
$3.60, which gave the average recipient a payoff of $25.80 (= $5 + $10 + 3×$3.60) and left the 
dictators with an average payoff of $11.40 (= $5 + $10 - $3.60). Furthermore, the behavior of the 
37% of subjects who did not give any money to the paired subject can be explained by self-
regarding (or “economic man”) preferences. Therefore, inequality aversion is not needed to 
explain the behavior of any subject in this experiment. 
 
2.4  Related Experiments 
Comparison of data from experiment 1 with data from other dictator experiments provides 
additional insight into the properties of subjects’ preferences. In the (DB1 and DB2) double-blind 
dictator experiments reported by Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994), the average 
amount sent to the paired subjects by the dictators was $1. In our experiment 1 dictator game, the 
average amount sent by the dictators was $3.60. The price to the dictator of buying an additional 
$1 of income for the paired subject was $1 in the Hoffman, et al. experiment and it is $0.33 in our 
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experiment 1. The implied (arc) price elasticity of demand for increasing the other subject’s 
income is –1.13, a quite reasonable figure. 
 Other papers that report experimental tests of inequality aversion models (Charness and 
Rabin, 2002; Deck, 2001; and Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) also find that the models’ 
predictions are inconsistent with the behavior of a large proportion of the subjects. Therefore 
there is a moderately large body of data that are inconsistent with inequality aversion, which 
suggests the need for a different type of model. After reporting their tests of inequality aversion, 
Charness and Rabin introduce the quasi-maximin model and apply it to data from several 
experiments. We next report direct tests of that model. 
 
3. Direct Tests of Quasi-Maximin Preferences 
 
3.1 The Quasi-Maximin Model 
Let x  denote a vector of money payoffs of n agents and ix  denote the payoff of agent i. Charness 
and Rabin’s (2002) “reciprocity-free” model is based on the assumption that the utility function 
of agent i is increasing with the amount of her own money payoff ( ix ), the minimum of all 
agents’ payoffs ( }{min
},,1{ jnj
x
…∈ ), and the total of all agents’ payoffs (∑=
n
j
jx
1
). The quasi-maximin 
utility function is assumed to be: 
(1) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++−= ∑
=∈
n
j
jjnji
i xxxxu
1},,1{
)1(}{min)1()( δδγγ
…
, 
where ]1,0[∈γ  and )1,0(∈δ . The γ  parameter measures the relative importance of own 
money payoff compared to the two other arguments of the utility function. The δ parameter 
measures the relative importance of these other two arguments, the minimum payoff and total 
payoff (or “efficiency”).   
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3.2 Experiments 2 and 3: Tests of Quasi-Maximin Preferences 
The three arguments of utility function (1) suggest the design of two experiments that provide 
direct tests for quasi-maximin preferences. In experiment 2, we offer subjects choices between 
alternatives in a dictator game in which the dictator’s own payoff and the minimum payoff are 
constant but the sum of all payoffs changes. The three rows in Table 1 show the choices open to a 
subject in experiment 2 when the $5 show-up fees are included in payoffs. Because the dictator’s 
payoff is the same in all rows and the lowest payoff is the same in all rows, the quasi-maximin 
model predicts that an agent will choose row 3, which has the highest total payoff to all agents 
(except in the limiting case in which 0=γ , where the model makes no prediction because this is 
the special case of self-regarding preferences). This row 3 prediction is independent of the piece-
wise linear form of the Charness-Rabin (2002) utility function. Thus the experiment provides a 
direct test of the assumed preference for efficiency per se. 
Whereas experiment 2 tests for a preference for efficiency, experiment 3 tests for the 
other defining property of the quasi-maximin model, the preference for increasing the payoff to 
the lowest paid agent (the maximin property). Thus, in experiment 3, we offer subjects choices in 
a dictator game in which the dictator’s own payoff and the total payoff are constant but the 
minimum payoff changes. The three rows in Table 2 show the choices open to a subject in this 
dictator experiment when the $5 show-up fees are included in payoffs. Since the dictator’s payoff 
is the same in all rows and the total payoff to all agents is the same in all rows, the quasi-maximin 
model predicts that an agent will choose row 3, which has the maximin payoff (except in the 
limiting case in which 0=γ , where the model makes no prediction because this is the special 
case of self-regarding preferences). This row 3 prediction is independent of the piece-wise linear 
form of the Charness-Rabin (2002) utility function. Thus the experiment provides a direct test of 
the assumed maximin property per se. 
3.3 Procedures in Experiments 2 and 3 
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Experiments 2 and 3 have the following characteristics. Subjects are randomly assigned to groups 
of four that consist of a dictator and three “non-dictators.” The dictators are told that they must 
choose one row from Table 1 in experiment 2 or one row from Table 2 in experiment 3. Different 
subjects participated in experiments 2 and 3. The experimental protocol uses double-blind payoff 
procedures in which neither the other subjects nor the experimenters can identify the individual 
who has chosen any specific action. All of the features of the experiment are common 
information given to the subjects. The experiment procedures are described in detail in Appendix 
1. The subject instructions are available on request to the authors. 
 
3.4 Behavior in Experiments 2 and 3 
Subjects’ behavior in experiments 2 and 3 is reported in Figure 4. We observe that only 5 of 33 
(or 15%) of the subjects chose row 3 in experiment 2, which is the unique prediction of the quasi-
maximin model. Thus, the behavior of 85% of the subjects in experiment 2 is inconsistent with 
quasi-maximin preferences. In experiment 3, only 2 of 32 (or 6%) of the subjects chose row 3, 
which is the unique prediction of the quasi-maximin model. Hence the behavior of 94% of the 
subjects in experiment 3 is inconsistent with the quasi-maximin model. 
 
4. The Egocentric Altruism Model 
 
The very high rates of inconsistency between subjects’ behavior and the testable implications of 
the inequality-aversion and quasi-maximin models suggest the need for a model with different 
properties. As it turns out, the behavior observed in experiments 1-3 can be rationalized by a 
utility function with the conventional properties of strict quasi-concavity (i.e., indifference curves 
that are strictly convex to the origin) and positive monotonicity (i.e., increasing) in the dictator’s 
income ix  and others’ incomes }{\},,1{, injx j …∈ . 
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 Andreoni and Miller (2002) test data from many dictator games, with varying budgets 
and own-payoff prices for altruistic actions, for consistency with utility-maximizing behavior by 
testing the data for consistency with the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP). They 
report that 98 percent of their subjects make decisions that are consistent with GARP and 
therefore are, in that specific sense, rational altruists. Furthermore, Andreoni and Miller report 
that constant elasticity of substitution (CES) parametric utility functions provide a good fit to data 
for their subjects. We develop a model based on CES utility functions that are modified to capture 
salient characteristics of subjects’ altruistic preferences that are revealed by our experiments. We 
begin by presenting the two-agent special case of the model. 
 
4.1 The Two-Agent Egocentric Altruism Model 
The two-agent special case of the egocentric altruism model represents other-regarding 
preferences with a modified CES utility function of an agent’s own (“my”) money payoff m  and 
the other agent’s (“your”) money payoff y  that is weighted by the altruism parameter 0≥θ : 
(2) 
( )
.0,
},0{\)1,(,1),(
==
−∞∈+=
α
αθα
θ
αα
my
ymymu
 
This utility function is assumed to be monotonically increasing in m and y and to have 
indifference curves that are negatively-sloped and strictly convex to the origin except for the 
boundary value of 0=θ , in which case the model is equivalent to the model of self-regarding 
preferences.  For 0>θ , the special case of 0=α  is the Cobb-Douglas utility function given in 
the second line of statement (2). 
The agent’s altruistic preferences are assumed to be “egocentric,” by which we mean that 
between two money allocations (a,b) and (b,a) the agent prefers the one that allocates the larger 
payoff to himself: 
(3) ),(),( bauabu > , for all a and b such that 0≥> ab . 
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Together, the assumptions of monotonicity, convexity, and egocentricity imply the following 
restrictions on the parameters of the utility function: 
(4) 1<α  and ).1,0[∈θ  
Differentiation of (2) yields the marginal rate of substitution between y and m: 
(5) αθ
−= 1)(1),(
m
yymMRS . 
Statements (4) and (5) imply that MRS(m,y): (a) is everywhere positive (monotonicity); (b) does 
not vary with m and y when relative income, y/m, is held constant (homotheticity); (c) increases 
with y/m (indifference curve convexity to the origin); and (d) is greater than 1 when y/m = 1 
(egocentricity). 
 
4.2 The Many-Agent Egocentric-Altruism Model 
The generalization of the egocentric altruism utility function to 2≥n  agents is: 
(6) 
( ) .0,
},0{\)1,(,1)(
=∏=
−∞∈⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ += ∑
≠
α
αθα
θ
αα
ji
ij
ji
i
xx
xxxu
 
where ix  is the money payoff of agent i and ijx j ≠, is the money payoff of agent j. The 
egocentric property generalizes to the n-agent case as follows. First define: 
(7)  nabba xx +ℜ∈,, ,  such that ,,, axx abkbai == ,,, bxx abibak ==  for some i and k, and 
ab
j
ba
j xx
,, =  for all }.,{\},,1{ kinj …∈  
Then the egocentricity property is 
(8) )()( ,, baiabi xuxu >  for all abba xx ,, ,  and a, b such that 0≥> ab . 
The parameter restrictions implied by monotonicity, egocentricity, and strict convexity are given 
by statement (4). 
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5. Explanatory Power of the Egocentric Altruism Model 
We first show that the egocentric altruism model is consistent with behavior in dictator game 
experiments 1, 2 and 3. We next report another dictator game experiment (experiment 4) that 
reveals other properties of subjects’ preferences that can be rationalized by the model. Lastly, we 
show that the model can rationalize data from experiments with proposer competition (Roth, et 
al., 1991) and responder competition (Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere, 1997). This procedure 
provides a check on how robust the model is to explaining behavior in distribution games. 
 
5.1 Is the Egocentric Altruism Model Consistent with Behavior in Experiments 1-3? 
We first ask whether the behavior of subjects in experiment 1 is consistent with the egocentric 
altruism model. In other words, are the data from experiment 1 consistent with the two-agent 
utility function given by equation (2) and the parameter restrictions in statement (4) that are 
implied by monotonicity, egocentricity, and convexity?  
In experiment 1, a dictator can choose a whole dollar amount s weakly between 0 and 10 to 
send to the paired subject. Each $1 sent decreases the dictator’s money payoff by $1 and 
increases the paired subject’s money payoff by $3. Hence, the slope of the dictator’s budget line 
is 3−  above the 45-degree line. Therefore, if the slope of an indifference curve ( MRS− ) at the 
point (15-1, 15+3), which corresponds to giving one dollar to the other person, is the same or 
larger than the slope of the budget line ( 3− ) then the most preferred option for the dictator is to 
give at least one dollar to the other person. If this is not true then the dictator’s most preferred 
choice is to give 1 or 0, depending on which of these two (whole dollar amounts) has larger 
utility. Appendix 3 derives this formally and shows that there exists a function of α , 
)1,3/1[)1,(: →−∞v  such that a dictator with 1)(/ >αθ v  will give at least $1 of her endowment 
to the paired subject whereas a dictator with 1)(/ <αθ v   will send 0. (For )(αθ v=   the 
dictator is indifferent between giving $1 or $0). 
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The data reported in Figure 3 reveal that 63% of the subjects made choices in experiment 1 
consistent with 1)(/ >αθ v  and 37% made the choice consistent with .1)(/ <αθ v  Specific 
),( θα  parameter values can rationalize each of the distinct observations in experiment 1. 
We now ask whether the subjects’ behavior in experiments 2 and 3 is consistent with the 
egocentric altruism model. In other words, are the data from experiments 2 and 3 consistent with 
the many-agent utility function given by equation (6) and the parameter restrictions in statement 
(5) that are implied by monotonicity, egocentricity, and convexity?  
With respect to experiment 2, the egocentric altruism model with 0≠θ  ranks row 2 higher 
than row 1 because the utility function is positively monotonic in all payoffs and some row 2 
payoffs are larger than the corresponding row 1 payoffs and no row 2 payoffs are lower than 
corresponding row 1 payoffs. With respect to rows 2 and 3, a dictator with 0=α  always prefers 
row 2 to row 3 because θθ )3875(15)20205(15 ××>×× . A dictator with 0≠α  prefers row 2 
to row 3 if .593<α  and she prefers row 3 to row 2 if .594.>α  In the later case, the most 
preferred row is row 3 because, from transitivity, if row 2 is preferred to row 1 and row 3 is 
preferred to row 2 then row 3 is preferred to row 1. We observe from Figure 4 that the egocentric 
altruism model is consistent with the behavior of 28 out of 33 (or 85%) of the subjects in 
experiment 2 who chose either row 2 or row 3. The 70% of dictators who chose row 2 reveal 
.593<α  and the 15% of the subjects who chose row 3 reveal .594>α .  
In experiment 3, row 2 is preferred to row 1 since the utility gain αθαα /)58( −  from an 
increase of the payoff of agent 1 by 3 units is always larger than the decrease in the utility, 
αθαα /)1720( − , from a reduction of the payoff of agent 2 by 3 units. If 0=α  then one has  
θθ )20203(15)20178(15 ××>×× , and therefore again row 2 is preferred to row 1 by such a 
dictator. Similarly, it can be verified that row 2 is preferred to row 3 as well, and therefore the 
egocentric altruism model predicts that the dictator will choose row 2 in experiment 3. We 
 12
observe from Figure 4 that 28 of 32 subjects chose row 2 in experiment 3; hence the egocentric 
altruism model is consistent with the behavior of 88% of the subjects in that experiment. 
 
5.2 Experiment 4: How Do Dictators Respond to the Opportunity to Take Money? 
 
A common feature of experiments 1 – 3 is that the dictator cannot take money from another 
subject and appropriate it himself. This means that the designs of those experiments do not cause 
the subjects to reveal information about some characteristics of their preferences. In order to 
construct an experiment that will reveal more about the subjects’ preferences, we expand the 
feasible set of experiment 1 to include opportunities to take money as well as give it away.  
 
5.2.1 Experimental Design and Procedures 
In experiment 4, subjects are randomly assigned to pairs. Each subject in a pair is given $10 plus 
a show-up fee of $5. The “non-dictators” have no decision to make. The dictator is asked to 
decide whether he wants to give up to $10 from his own endowment to the other subject or take 
up to $5 of the other subject’s endowment or neither give nor take anything. Amounts given or 
taken have to be in whole dollar amounts. Any amount given to the other subject is multiplied by 
three by the experimenter. Each dollar taken from the other subject increases the dictator’s payoff 
by one dollar; that is, there is no multiplication by three by the experimenter. The experimental 
protocol uses double-blind payoff procedures. All of the features of the experiment, including the 
equal endowments, are common information given to the subjects. In summary, experiment 4 
differs from experiment 1 only by introduction of the opportunity to take money from the paired 
subject. The experiment procedures are described in Appendix 1. The subject instructions are 
available on request to the authors. 
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5.2.2 Subjects’ Behavior in Experiment 4 
Data from experiment 4 are reported in Figure 3 with the dark-colored bars. Note that 22 of 32 or 
69% of the dictators took money from the other person and 18 of 32 or 56% took the maximum 
possible amount, $5. Also, 3 of 32 or 9% of the dictators gave money to the other person and 7 of 
32 or 22% neither gave nor took any money (they chose $0 as the amount to send or take). Note 
that 22% of the dictators chose equal payoffs and 78% chose unequal payoffs.  
 Figure 3 shows very different outcomes in experiments 1 and 4. Introduction of the 
opportunity to take money changes the distribution of behavior from appearing to be 
predominantly altruistic to appearing to be predominantly selfish. Just such behavior is consistent 
with a model with down-sloping indifference curves that are strictly convex to the origin. For 
example, Figure 5 shows indifference curves (for 5.0=α  and 5.0=θ ) that would lead the same 
agent to give $4 in experiment 1 and take $5 in experiment 4. 
Although Figure 5 shows how the egocentric altruism model is consistent with giving in 
experiment 1 and taking in experiment 4, alternative parameter values are consistent with the 
behavior of subjects who give money or choose 0=s  in experiment 4. For example, if 5.0=α  
and 6.0=θ  then the optimal choice is to give $5 in both experiments 1 and 4. If 6−=α  and 
7.0=θ  then the optimal choice in both experiments 1 and 4 is 0=s .  
The implications of the model for behavior in experiment 4 are as follows. The dictator’s 
budget line in this experiment is piecewise linear, with slope that increases from 3−  above the 
45-degree line to 1−  below it. Indifference curves of utility function (2) have negative slopes that 
decrease as my /  increases. Hence, if the slope at the payoff vector (m,y) = (16,14), implied by 
taking $1, is smaller than 3−  (which is smaller than 1− ) then so are the slopes at all points with 
higher y/m. This implies that the optimal choice is to take at least $1. On the other hand if the 
slope at the payoff vector resulting from giving $1 is larger than 1−  (which is larger than 3− ) 
then so is the slope at all points with lower y/m. Hence, in that case, the best choice is to give at 
 14
least $1. If however, the slope of an indifference curve at the payoff vector resulting from taking 
$1 is larger than 1− , and the slope from giving $1 is smaller than 3− , then the dictator’s optimal 
choice is to take $1, give $1, or choose $0 depending on which of them has the highest utility. 
Appendix 3 presents a complete derivation of the model’s predictions for experiment 4. It is 
shown there that there exist three functions of the α  curvature parameter, ,,vh  and w  such that 
a dictator with )(αθ h< will take money if )(αθ w<  or choose 0 if )(αθ w> , whereas a 
dictator with )(αθ h> will either give a positive amount of money if )(αθ v>  or choose 0 if 
)(αθ v< . 
 
5.3  Explaining Competition 
We next consider the question of how robust is the empirical consistency of the egocentric 
altruism model with behavior. We here consider experiments that involve competition among the 
agents on “one side” of the game. 
 
5.3.1 Game with Proposer Competition 
Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991) report results from experiments in four 
countries with the following game of proposer competition. 1−n  proposers can simultaneously 
propose ],0[ Ss j ∈ , 1,,,2,1 −⋅⋅⋅= nj in discrete increments. The responder can accept or reject 
the highest offer, },,max{ 121 −⋅⋅⋅= nssss . If the responder accepts the highest offer then the 
proposer who made the offer gets sS − , the other proposers get 0, and the responder gets s . If 
more then one proposer makes the accepted offer then one of the proposers is randomly selected, 
with equal probability for all tied proposers, to get sS − . The experiments included several 
response periods. One period was randomly selected for money payoff to the subjects. The 
predictions of the egocentric altruism model for this experiment are as follows.  
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 A formal proof is provided in Appendix 3. Here we offer an informal demonstration that 
conveys intuition about the implications of the egocentric altruism model for subgame perfect 
equilibrium in the game with proposer competition. The responder prefers the money payoffs 
from accepting any 0≥s  to payoffs from rejecting it because, in the former case, at least one 
player has a strictly higher payoff and utility function (6) is monotonically increasing in all 
payoffs. Thus the responder will accept all offers. Because of egocentricity and convexity, a 
proposer prefers the payoffs from the set of offers in which he is one of k  proposers, 
11 −≤< nk , who submits s  > 0 and has k/1  probability of receiving sS − , to the payoffs 
from ssP <  where he gets 0 for sure (in addition to the show-up fee). Thus one has the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Let s be the highest offer submitted by proposers in the game of proposer 
competition. Then  
1) The responder will accept all offers; 
2) For proposers:  
a) all proposers offering *sS −  is a subgame perfect symmetric equilibrium;  
b) any vector of offers with at least two proposers offering S is a subgame perfect 
asymmetric equilibrium;  
c) there are no asymmetric subgame perfect equilibria with the highest offer less than S.  
 
In the Roth, et al. (1991) study, 1000=S and 5* =s . Data from their experiment show 
that 72 (resp. 14) out of 158 proposers offered 995 (resp. 1000) at round 10. In that round 2 out of 
18 groups are settled in the equilibrium given in part 2.b of Proposition 1. If we allow for an error 
of two players, that is if at least 7 (resp. 5) out of 9 (resp. 7) offer 995 )( *sS −= , then 6 out of 18 
groups are settled at the symmetric equilibrium given part by 2.a of Proposition 1.  
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5.3.2  Game with Responder Competition 
Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere (1997) report an experiment with a game in which a proposer 
makes an offer s , ],0[ Ss ∈  to 1−n  responders. In this experiment S  is 50 French francs and 
.6=n A responder can accept or reject the proposal. If only one of the responders accepts the 
offer then she gets s , the other responders get 0, and the proposer gets sS − . If more then one 
responder accepts the proposal then one of the responders is randomly selected to get s . If all of 
the responders reject the proposal then all players get 0. The experiments were run with a design 
in which responders were asked to pre-commit to acceptance thresholds for a period before 
observing the proposal for that period. The experiment included several response periods. 
Subjects received money payoffs for every period. Subjects were informed at the end of each 
period of their own payoff but not the payoffs received by others. The predictions of the 
egocentric altruism model for this experiment are as follows. 
Appendix 3 presents a formal proof of the egocentric altruism model’s subgame perfect 
equilibrium for the game with responder competition. Here we present an informal demonstration 
that conveys intuition about the properties of the equilibrium. Consider any proposal, 0≥s . If all 
responders reject the proposal, everyone gets money payoff of 0. Therefore, a responder prefers 
to accept  any 0≥s , rather than accept the outcome where everyone gets 0, because of the 
positive monotonicity of utility function (6). If k  other responders, 21 −≤≤ nk , accept 0>s , 
the utility function implies that a responder also prefers to accept 0>s  because the payoffs 
determined by a )1/(1 +k  probability of receiving 0>s  are preferable to those where the 
responder receives 0 for sure. Since responders will accept any proposal, the proposer will 
propose the offer Ps  that maximizes his own utility function. One responder will be randomly 
selected to receive Ps and the proposer will receive ( PsS − ). Let the vector of payoffs be 
njjxx ,,1)( …==  with the first element the proposer’s payoff. In the experiment, the proposer does 
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not know which responder received the payoff determined by the proposal in any preceding 
round. Since the responders’ best reply is to accept everything, it is reasonable to assume that the 
proposer believes that the responders are equally likely to receive the proposed payoff in any 
round of the experiment. Thus the proposer’s expected payoff for each responder j after round t is 
∑
=
≡−+== tr
P
rtjj ysn
xxEx
..1
0, )(1
1)( , j=2,…,n, where 00 ≥x is the show-up fee. The payoff of 
the proposer is ∑
=
−+=
tr
P
rsSxx
..1
01 )( . Hence, the proposer’s expected utility is (*) 
∑
≠−= ik k sUnsEU )(1
1)( , where  
(9) 
( ) ( )[ ]
.0)))(((
},0{\]1,(,)2()(1)(
2
1
1
=+−+=
−∞∈−+++−+=
− α
αθα
θ
ααα
n
k
kk
ysxsSx
ynsxsSxsU
 
Substituting (9) in (*) one has  
(10) 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) .0,)()(
},0{\]1,(,)2()(1)(
2
1
1
=+−+=
−∞∈−+++−+=
− α
αθα
θ
ααα
nysysSx
ynsysSxsEU
 
This is the intuition behind the following proposition that is proved in Appendix 3. 
  
Proposition 2. In the subgame perfect equilibrium:  
1) All responders accept all proposals;  
2) The proposer’s offer Ps maximizes expected utility function (10).  
 
Data from the experiment show that the percentage of responders choosing  0 thresholds 
to be 13%, 30% , 40%, 50% and 67% in the first to fifth rounds. Although the responders’ 
behavior has not fully converged by round 5 (the last round), continuation of this monotonic 
convergence pattern to at least 8 rounds would have had 100% of responders choosing 0 
thresholds. Thus the monotonic convergence pattern in the data appears to be consistent with part 
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1 of Proposition 2. Proposers’ behavior does appear to have converged by round 4 because, from 
the third round on, there is always at least one responder with a 0 (resp. 1) threshold in 10 (resp. 
12) out of 12 groups. Therefore, the proposers can be assured that their proposals will be accepted 
by at least one responder and, therefore, they can choose proposals that maximixe their utility. 
The data show that 11 (resp. 8) out of 12 proposers offer at least 5 (resp. 10) French francs, which 
reveals that proposers have altruistic preferences, because proposers with self-regarding 
preferences would choose 0 when assured of acceptance by at least one responder.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
As shown in Charness and Rabin (2002), Deck (2001), Engelman and Strobel (2004), and section 
2 above, a large majority of subjects make choices that are inconsistent with inequality aversion 
models in dictator game experiments designed to provide direct tests for inequality aversion. As 
shown in section 3, most subjects make choices that are inconsistent with the quasi-maximin 
model in dictator game experiments that are designed to directly test the central defining 
characteristics of the model. In contrast, the egocentric altruism model is consistent with the 
behavior of most of the subjects in all four different types of dictator games. Furthermore, the 
egocentric altruism model is consistent with the behavior of a high proportion of subjects in 
competitive experiments reported in the literature, including experiments with proposer 
competition and responder competition. Thus the empirical success of the egocentric altruism 
model is robust to several distinct types of experiments run by different researchers. The common 
feature of these experiments is that they involve games that do not elicit reciprocal motives; they 
are dictator games or games in one-sided competitive environments. This suggests the important 
question of whether the egocentric altruism model can be generalized to incorporate reciprocal 
motives, thus holding out the promise of an empirically-motivated and unified approach to 
modeling social preferences in environments both with and without reciprocal motives. 
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 Two generalizations of the two-agent egocentric altruism model are being developed, one 
parametric and the other non-parametric. In the parametric model, the weight on the other 
person’s payoff in the agent’s CES utility function depends on the kindness or unkindness of 
others’ choices (their revealed intentions) and on their status relative to the agent. The parametric 
model incorporating intentions and status is applied to data from several types of games with 
reciprocal motivations and with and without induced status differences. In the nonparametric 
model, the indifference curves of the utility function are always convex to the origin, but the 
marginal rate of substitution between ones’ own and another’s payoff depends on the other’s 
previous actions. Two partial orderings are introduced, an ordering of preferences by a formal 
representation of “more altruistic than” and an ordering of opportunity sets by a formal 
representation of “more generous than.” These partial orderings are linked by: (a) the “reciprocity 
axiom” which specifies that more generous choices by a first mover induce more altruistic 
preferences in a second mover; and (b) the “status quo axiom” which specifies that generous acts 
of commission induce more altruistic preferences than equally-generous acts of omission. The 
nonparametric model based on the reciprocity and status quo axioms is applied to data from 
several types of games with reciprocal motivations, some distinguished by acts of commission or 
omission. 
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Table 1. Feasible Choices in Experiment 2 
 
m y1 y2 y3 
15 5 11 11 
15 5 20 20 
15 5 7 38 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Feasible Choices in Experiment 3 
 
m y1 y2 y3 
15 5 20 20 
15 8 17 20 
15 9 10 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
m
y
45o line
Predicted 
choice
 
Figure 1. Budget (dashed) Line and Indifference “Curves”  for the Fehr- Schmidt Model 
( 1/3= 1/2= βα  and ).  
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Figure 2. Budget (dashed) Line and Indifference Curves” for the Bolton-Ockenfels Model.  
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Figure 3. Dictators’ Decisions in Experiments 1 and 4 
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Appendix 1: Experiment Procedures 
Procedures of Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was a manual (i.e., non-computerized) experiment with a double-blind payoff 
protocol. During the decision-making part of an experiment session, all interactions with the 
subjects were carried out by a “monitor” that had been randomly selected from the subject pool. 
In addition to distributing and collecting “decision envelopes,” the monitor was given the 
responsibility of verifying that the experimenters accurately implemented subjects’ decisions in 
calculating payoffs. The monitor did not discuss the decision task with the subjects. The monitor 
was paid $20. The amount paid to a monitor was not announced to the subjects so as to avoid the 
possible suggestion of a focal point earnings figure.  
 The subjects first gathered in a room adjacent to the laboratory. The monitor was 
randomly selected from the group of subjects by drawing a ball from a bingo cage in the presence 
of all of the subjects. Next, all of the rest of the subjects were randomly assigned to “group X” 
and “group Y.” All subjects then entered the laboratory. Group X subjects were seated at widely 
separated computer terminals with privacy side and front partitions. (The computers were not 
used.) The group Y subjects were standing at the back of the room. Each subject and the monitor 
were given copies of the instructions. Then the experimenter read aloud the instructions. After the 
reading of instructions was completed, the group Y subjects were escorted back to the adjacent 
room. The group X subjects had no further contact with the group Y subjects. Then the group X 
subjects were given the opportunity to raise their hands if they had questions. If a subject raised 
his hand, he was approached by the experimenter and given an opportunity to ask questions and 
receive answers in a low voice that could not be overheard by other subjects. When there were no 
more questions, the experimenter left the room and the monitor took over. There was no 
interaction between the experimenter and the subjects during the decision-making part of an 
experiment session. All distribution and collection of envelopes containing subject response 
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forms was done by the monitor. Because subject decision forms were inside envelopes when they 
were distributed and collected, not even the monitor could know any subject’s personal decision.  
The payoff procedure was double blind: (a) subject responses were identified only by 
letters that were private information of the subjects; and (b) money payoffs were collected in 
private from sealed envelopes contained in lettered mailboxes. Double blind payoffs were 
implemented by having each subject draw an unmarked sealed envelope containing a distinctly-
lettered key from a box containing many envelopes. The subjects wrote their key letters on their 
response forms; thus payoffs could be correctly made. At the end of the experiment, the subjects 
used their keys to open lettered mailboxes that contained their money payoffs in sealed 
envelopes. The experimenters were not present in the mailbox room when the subjects collected 
their payoff envelopes.  
All of the above-described features of the experimental design and procedures were 
common information given to the subjects before they made their decisions. The subject 
instructions and response forms did not use evocative labels in referring to the two groups of 
subjects. Instead, the terms “group X” and “group Y” were used. No subject participated in more 
than one experiment session.  
All of the experiment sessions ended with each subject being asked to earn his $5 show-
up fee by filling out a questionnaire. Group X and group Y subjects had distinct questionnaires. 
The questions asked had three functions: (a) to provide additional data; (b) to provide a check for 
possible subject confusion about the decision tasks; and (c) to provide checks for possible 
recording errors by the experimenters and counting errors by the subjects. Subjects did not write 
their names or any other identity-revealing information on the questionnaires. The additional data 
provided by the questionnaires included the subjects’ reports of their payoff key letters. Data 
error checks provided by the questionnaires came from asking the group X subjects to report the 
numbers of tokens sent. These reports, together with two distinct records kept by the 
experimenters, provided accuracy checks on data recording. 
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Procedures of Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was a manual (i.e., non-computerized) experiment with a double-blind payoff 
protocol. Double-blind payoffs could be, and were, implemented in this experiment without the 
use of a monitor and mailbox payoff procedure because the payoffs to the dictators were 
independent of their choices. 
  The subjects first gathered in a room adjacent to the laboratory. The stations in the 
laboratory were randomly assigned, in equal numbers, to four groups. This was done 
independently for each experiment session. A large manila envelope containing experiment 
documents was placed at each station. Subjects entered the laboratory and sat at any station they 
chose but without any way of knowing which of the four groups that station had been randomly 
assigned to. Each station had privacy side and front partitions. Procedural instructions were 
projected on a screen at the front of the room. The dictators were designated group W. The other 
subjects were designated groups X, Y and Z. The subjects in groups X, Y, and Z were given 
questionnaires to fill out; in this way it was not clear to other groups during the experiment which 
of the seats were occupied by individuals randomly assigned to be dictators. After the passage of 
more than enough time for decisions to be recorded, an experimenter asked from a back 
laboratory door for everyone who had completed his questionnaire to raise his or her hand.  After 
all hands were raised, two messages were alternated on the projection screen at the front of the 
laboratory. One message instructed group X, Y and Z subjects to “wait for further instructions.” 
The other message instructed group W subjects to put all of the experiment material except the 
disclaimer form and the sealed white legal-size envelope back in the large manila envelope and 
deposit the manila envelope in a box at the front of the laboratory while exiting. They were 
instructed that the sealed white envelope contained their payoffs ($10 plus the show-up fee of $5). 
These envelopes were sealed and had labels attached on both sides with the instruction “not to 
open this envelope until after exiting the building.”  After all group W subjects had exited, an 
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experimenter retrieved the box and took it to the separate rear “monitor” room. The forms with 
the group W subjects’ decisions were extracted. Then the group X, Y and Z subjects were called, 
one at a time to receive their show-up fees and the payoffs determined by the group W subjects’ 
decisions. This process involved another randomization: the group W subjects’ decision forms 
were applied in random order to determine the payoffs of group X, and Y, and Z subjects. The 
three screens of projected instructions and the printed instructions contained in the large manila 
envelopes are available on an experimenter’s homepage, as explained in footnote 1.  
All of the above-described features of the experimental design and procedures were 
common information given to the subjects. The subject instructions and response forms did not 
use evocative labels, such as “dictator” in referring to the four groups of subjects. Instead, the 
terms “group W,” “group X,” “group Y” and “group Z” were used. No subject participated in 
more than one experiment session.  
 
Procedures of Experiment 3 
The experiment procedures and subject instructions for experiment 3 were the same as those for 
experiment 2 except for the use of the payoffs in Table 2 rather than Table 1.  
 
Procedures of Experiment 4 
The experiment procedures and subject instructions for experiment 4 were the same as those for 
experiment 1 except for minimal changes necessary to introduce the opportunity for group X 
subjects to take money from paired group Y subjects as well as give them money. 
 
Appendix 2: Derivations of Indifference Curves 
Indifference Curves for the Fehr-Schmidt Model 
 
The F&S model is based on the assumption that agent ,i where ,,2,1 ni ⋅⋅⋅=  has preferences that 
can be represented by utility functions of the form 
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(A. 1) )0,max(
1
1)0,max(
1
1)( j
ij
iii
ij
jiii xxn
xx
n
xxu −−−−−−= ∑∑ ≠≠ βα  
where ii αβ ≤  and 10 <≤ iβ . The utility function for the two-agent case can be written as 
(A. 2) )(),( mymymum −−= α , if ym <  
  )( ymm −−= β , if ym ≥  
where ixm =  is “my income” and jxy =  is “your income.”  
 All parameter values that are consistent with inequality aversion imply that the 
indifference “curves” have positive slope above the 45-degree line because 
01
/
/ >+=∂∂
∂∂−= α
α
yu
mu
dm
dy
m
m  for ym < . Figure 1 shows indifference “curves” for the F&S 
model for 2/1=α  and 3/1=β . 
 
Indifference Curves for the Bolton-Ockenfels Model 
 
The B&O model is based on a “motivation function” of the form, 
(A. 3) ),( iiii xvv λ=  
where 
(A. 4) ∑
=
=
n
j
jii xx
1
/λ , if 0
1
>∑
=
n
j
jx  
   n/1= , if 0
1
=∑
=
n
j
jx . 
Given that the sum of my income (m) and your income (y) is positive, the motivation function for 
the two-agent case can be written as 
(A. 5) ))/(,( ymmmvv += , 
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where )(⋅v  is (B&O, pgs. 171-172) globally non-decreasing and concave in my income m, 
strictly concave in relative income )/( ymm + , and has a partial derivative with respect to 
relative income with the property 
(A. 6) 0)2/1,(2 =mv , for all m. 
Statement (A.5) and concavity imply that 0))/(,(2 >+ ymmmv  for )/( ymm + <1/2 
which is equivalent to .ym <  Hence, above the 45-degree line indifference curves have positive 
slope since 0)(
/
/
2
2
1 >++=∂∂
∂∂−=
m
y
mv
ymv
yv
mv
dm
dy
 for such ym < . Figure 2 shows typical 
graphs of the level sets or indifference curves of the B&O motivation function for the two-agent 
case with 0>+ ym . 
Appendix 3: Derivations of Propositions 
   
Dictator Game Experiments 1 and 4. 
Denote ,)( αttf =  if }0{\)1,(−∞∈α  and ),()( tntf A=  if .0=α  Then define the following 
functions ),3/1()1,(: ∞>−−∞v  such that
)15()18(
)14()15()(
ff
ffv −
−=α , and )1,0()1,(: >−−∞w  such 
that .
)14()15(
)15()16()(
ff
ffw −
−=α  
I. Let as be the amount sent by a dictator in experiment 1. Then 1≥as  for all ),( θα  
such that θα <)(v and 0=as  if .)( θα >v  
II. Let bs be the amount sent by a dictator in experiment 4. There exists a function 
)1,3/1()1,(: >−−∞h such that for any given α  
a. if )(αθ h>  then 1≥bs  if θα <)(v and 0=bs  if .)( θα >v  
b. if )(αθ h<  then 1−≤bs  if θα <)(w  and 0=bs  if .)( θα >w  
 
  In these dictator games, each dictator and non-dictator is given $15. In experiment 1, a dictator 
can give the paired person a whole dollar amount in [0, 10], whereas in experiment 4 he can give 
or take away from the paired person a whole dollar amount in [-5,10]. Thus, the budget set in 
experiment 1 is given by ]}10,0[|)315,15{( ∈+−=Ω sssa , whereas in experiment 4 the 
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budget set is −Ω∪Ω=Ω ab , where =Ω− ]}0,5[|)15,15{( −∈+− sss . The dictator’s utility 
as a function of argument s in experiment 4 is: 
 
(A. 7) 
( )
( ) ).0,5[,15,15
],10,0[,315,15)(
1
1
−∈+−=
∈+−=
sssu
sssusU
 
with ),(1 ⋅⋅u  as given by statement (3) in section 4.1. The dictator’s utility as a function of 
argument s in experiment 1 is given by the first row in (A.7). The slope dmdy /  of an 
indifference curve through a point Ω∈P  in the budget set in experiment 4 is given by  
 
(A. 8) 
],0,5[,
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151
],10,0[,
15
3151
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1
−∈⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−=
∈⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−=
−
−
sif
s
s
sif
s
s
dm
dy
α
α
θ
θ
 
where again the first row is relevant for experiment 1. 
 
First we derive part I. Note that the slope dmdy /  of an indifference curve decreases as we move 
upward along a budget-line segment, i.e. as s  increases. This implies that if the slope of the 
indifference curve through (14,18) is larger than or equal to the slope of the budget line at (14,18) 
then the most preferred point for the dictator is (14,18) or some point on the budget line to the left 
and above it. Thus, if 3)18,14( −≥
dm
dy
, i.e. θ
α
<⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −1
7
9
3
1
 then U(s) takes its maximum on  
[0, 10] at  
(A. 9) 
.1
3
5,10
,
3
5
7
9
3
1,
1)3(
1)3(15),(
1
11
)1/(1
)1/(1
1
<<=
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−
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−
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where the first expression is derived by solving 0)(' =sU  for 0>s  (or 3)( −=P
dm
dy
, 
aP Ω∈ ) ). Note that 11 ≥s  follows from 3)18,14( −≥dm
dy
. Let ][x denote the largest integer 
smaller than x. Then the dictator’s most preferred choice as  is to send [s1] or 1+[s1] depending on 
which is larger, ])([ 1sU  or ).1]([ 1 +sU  In case that the slope at (14,18) is smaller than the slope 
of the budget set, which is 3− , then 0 is the most preferred point if and only if ),1()0( UU >  
which is equivalent to .)( θα >v  This completes the proof of Part I. Note that ),(1 θαs  takes 
values from 1 to 10 and therefore sending any integer from 1 to 10 which is observed in the data 
can be explained by this model. 
 
Next we derive part II. Consider the part of the budget set, −Ω  in experiment 4 that is below the 
45-degree line. Similarly as in experiment 1, if the slope of the indifference curve through  
(16, 15) (which corresponds to taking away $1) is smaller than or equal to the slope, 1−  of the 
budget line segment −Ω , then the most preferred choice in [-5,0] is to take away $1 or more. In 
other words, if ( ) αθ −≤ 18/7  then U(s) takes its maximum on [-5,0] at some ]1,5[2 −∈s  given by 
(A. 10)  
,
2
10,5
,
8
7
2
1,
1
115),(
1
1
1)1/(1
)1/(1
2
α
α
αα
α
θ
θθ
θθα
−
−
−−
−
<≤−=
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−−=
if
ifs
 
where the first expression is derived by solving 0)(' =sU  ( or −Ω∈PP
dm
dy ),( ) for ].0,5[−∈s  
Then the most preferred choice, −s  for the dictator in [-5,0] is to take away [s2] or ([s2] +1), 
depending on which is larger, ])([ 2sU  or ).1]([ 2 +sU  On the other hand, if the slope of the 
indifference curve through (16,14) is larger than 1− , which is the slope of the budget-line 
segment −Ω , then the most preferred choice is either 0 or to take away 1, whichever has larger 
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utility. It can be verified that )1()0( −> UU  if and only if ).(αθ w>  Combining these results 
with the results in Part I, one has the following possible cases. The most preferred choice bs  in 
experiment 4 is: 
1. 0 for all ),( θα  such as ).()( αθα vw <<  Indeed, from part I )(αθ v<  implies 
)0()( UsU <  for all whole dollar amounts s in [0,10] and from the last paragraph 
θα <)(w  implies )0()( UsU < for all whole amounts of dollars s in [-5,0].  
2. To take away )1( −≤−s  for all ),( θα  such that )(αθ w<  and )(αθ v< . )(αθ w<  
implies )()( −< sUsU  for all whole amounts of dollars from [-5,0] and )(αθ v<  
implies )0()( UsU <  for all whole amounts of dollars s from [0,10]. Hence the most 
preferred choice is −s . 
3. To give )1(≥as for all ),( θα  such that θα <)(w  and )(αθ v> (similarly as 1. and 2.). 
4. Either take )1( −≤−s  or give )1(≥as , whichever has larger utility for all ),( θα  such that 
).()( αθα wv <<  The following derives regions of ),( θα  for which take −s  or give as  
is the most preferred choice.  
Consider RF >−×−∞ )1,3/1()1,(:  such that )),(()),((),( 21 θαθαθα sUsUF −=  and let a 
function )1,3/1()1,(: >−−∞h be constructed as follows. For any given α , let )(αh  denote the 
value of θ  that solves equation 0),( =θαF . Such a θ  is unique for any given α  since 
0),( =θαF  has a unique solution on (1/3, 1). This follows from ),( θαF  and  
(i)  0))3/1,(()0(),(lim 23/1 <−=↓ αθαθ sUUF ,  
(ii)  0)0())1,((),(lim 11 >−=↑ UsUF αθαθ , 
and 
(iii) θθθθθ
θα
∂
∂−∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂=∂
∂ )()()()(),( 22
2
211
1
1 sUs
s
sUsUs
s
sUF
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  0)15()315( 21 >+−+= α
αα ss
. 
Statements (i) and (ii) imply that, for all values of ),( θα  such that )(αθ h< , the dictator’s 
optimal choice is to take 2s  from the other person whereas for all values of ),( θα  such that 
)(αθ h>  the dictator’s optimal choice is to give 1s  to other person. (Of course, the dictator is 
indifferent between choosing 1s or 2s  for all values of ),( θα  such that )(αθ h= .) The last 
result and statements 1 – 4 above imply statements (a) and (b) in Part II of Proposition 0.  
 
Proposition 1. Games with Proposer Competition   
In the Roth, et al. (1991) study subjects were paid only for one randomly chosen round. Therefore 
the payoff vector of n-1 proposers and 1 responder before payoff of a salient decision is 
),...,( 00 xxx = , where 0x  is the show up fee. Let the maximum offer be 0≥s . 
 
Part (1). Suppose that the responder rejects it. Then all players get only the show-up fee 0x  and 
therefore, from the monotonicity assumption, the responder is better off by deviating and 
accepting s  since then for at least one player the monetary payoff becomes strictly larger than 
0x . Hence, it is a dominant strategy for the responder to accept any offer 0≥s .  
 
Part (2). Denote ( )000001 ,...,,,, xxxsSxsxz +−+=  and ( )00002 ,...,,, xxxsxsSz ++−= . If 
Ss <  then the egocentricity property implies  
(A. 11) )()( 1
1
2
1 zuzu > . 
a) Suppose that all proposers offer *sSss −==  and the responder accepts it. This is an 
equilibrium since the responder cannot do better by rejecting, as part (1) shows, and no 
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proposer can do better by deviating up or down as follows. The payoff vector for a proposer 
is 1z  or 2z , with probability k/11− or k/1 . This implies that the expected utility is 
)()/11()()/1()( 1
1
2
1
* zukzuksSEu
i −+=− . Deviating up can only be done by offering S, 
which results in the payoff vector ( )0000 ,...,,, xxxSxz +=+ . From the convexity 
assumption, )()( 11
1 +≥ zuzu , which together with (A.11) implies ).()( 1* +>− zusSEui  
Thus deviating up makes the proposer worse off. Deviating down doesn’t make the proposer 
better off either since it results in the payoff vector 1z  for sure and then from (A.11) 
)()( 1
1
* zusSEu
i >− .  
b) We show that any vector of offers with at least two proposers offering S is equilibrium. In 
this case the payoff vector for any proposer  i  is .+z  Any deviation up or down of a proposer 
with lower offer than S has no effect on the payoff vector. Similarly, any deviation down by 
one of the proposers with offer S does not affect the payoff vector either. Therefore no player 
is strictly better off by deviating from his offer.  
c) Let an asymmetric offers vector O with the highest offer s  less than S be given. The payoff 
vector for a proposer with offer s  less than s  (such a proposer exists because O is 
asymmetric) is .1z  Deviating up and offering s  makes this proposer better of since the 
payoff vector in that case is 1z  with probability 1-1/k and 2z with probability 1/k, and (A.11) 
implies ).()( susSEu ii >−  
 
 
Proposition 2. Games with Responder Competition   
Let Ps  be the proposer's proposal in a subgame perfect equilibrium.  
Part (1). Similar to part (1) of Proposition 1. 
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Part (2). Since any offer will be accepted in equilibrium, the proposer’s offer is determined 
by ]},0[|)(max{arg SssEUsP ∈= , where )(sEU  is defined in statement (10) in section 5.3.2. 
Differentiating (10) with respect to s , one has 
(A. 12) 
( )
.0y)-s-)x+s-((Syy)+(s
},0{\)1,(,)()(
1
2)-(n1-
11
1
==
−∞∈++−+−= −−
αθ
αθ
θθ
αα
if
ifsysSx
ds
sdEU
 
Let *s  denote the value of s that solves equation 0/)( =dssdEU , i.e. ( )ρ
ρ
+
−+=
1
1* ySxs  
where )1/(1 αθρ −= .  We conclude that  
(A. 13) 
.,
,/)(,
),/(,0
*
1
1
otherwises
xSyifS
SxyifsP
=
+>=
+<=
ρ
ρ
 
 
